Pilot's haunting four last words before deadly plane crash from UK to Tenerife

While Tenerife has two airports, Tenerife North poses specific challenges for pilots, positioned at an altitude of 2,000ft.

When combined with meteorological factors such as cloud cover, visibility can be dramatically impaired, generating perilous flying conditions.

The flight deck crew comprised three seasoned aviators - Captain Arthur Whelan, aged 50, First Officer Michael Firth, 33, and flight engineer Raymond Carey, 33. Along with five cabin crew members, there were 146 passengers and personnel aboard.

Wind conditions were arriving from an atypical direction, causing aircraft to be redirected to Runway 12 rather than the standard landing runway. This presented a significant problem for 34-year-old air traffic controller Justo Camin, as another aircraft was already making its approach to the identical runway, raising the risk of a catastrophic mid-air collision.

With no radar available, Camin was forced to rely on procedural techniques for air traffic management, guiding each aircraft along a predetermined flight path.

At 1:18pm, Camin realised he needed to place the Dan Air crew into a holding pattern to allow the aircraft ahead to land safely on Runway 12.

However, no established holding pattern existed for this particular runway, leaving Camin to improvise. He instructed Flight 1008 to enter a left-hand holding pattern, circling overhead until the other aircraft had landed.

In response to First Officer Firth's position report, Camin said, "Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly."

Captain Whelan replied with a simple "Roger", failing to read back Camin's instructions. Had he done so, the disaster that unfolded might have been prevented.

However, when Camin instructed them to "turn to the left," he had intended to say "turns to the left," indicating the direction the crew should fly whilst executing the holding pattern.

But without that crucial 's', the crew interpreted this as "turn to the left."

Camin, who had also authorised the flight for an altitude of 5,000 feet, made a minor but disastrous error.

Captain Whelan, puzzled by the unexpected instruction to enter a holding pattern that wasn't displayed on any of his charts, completed a single left turn, adopting a heading of 150 degrees, assuming this aligned with the controller's intentions.

The aircraft was now soaring over mountainous terrain, where the minimum safe altitude was 14,500 feet.

Just one minute and six seconds before impact, one of the pilots remarked, "bloody strange hold, isn't it?" before adding, "It doesn't parallel with the runway or anything."

The cockpit voice recorder clearly captured the crew's escalating concern, yet no one challenged the controller's instructions.

Controller Camin, under the belief the aircraft was over the sea in his improvised holding pattern, permitted the plane to descend another 1,000 feet, unaware that it was actually surrounded by mountains.

Captain Whelan voiced his doubts about Camin's instruction to his co-pilot in the cockpit, stating, "I don't like that."

His co-pilot replied, "they want us to keep going more round, don't they?".

At that moment, the automatic ground alarm sounded in the cockpit, warning them to "pull up, pull up!".

In a desperate attempt to evade the impending mountainous terrain, Captain Whelan abruptly abandoned his left turn for a sharp right turn. He believed this manoeuvre would enable them to clear the imminent obstacle.

Normally, when such an alarm activates, the correct procedure would be to "pull up" to achieve sufficient altitude and clear any surrounding terrain.

After examining the chart, co-pilot Firth recognised the captain's assessment was wrong and suggested alternative actions.

The words "let's get out of here," spoken by Flight Engineer Carey, were recorded on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). However, despite the engineer's warning, Captain Whelan continued with the sharp right turn, resulting in the aircraft losing 300 feet.

Spanish investigators determined conclusively in their findings this action sealed the flight's fate, rendering catastrophe unavoidable.

Flight Engineer Carey's desperate shouts of "bank angle, bank angle!" were the final sounds captured before the CVR went silent.

Dan-Air Flight 1008 met its devastating end when it struck La Esperanza at 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 metres) below the summit.

The impact destroyed most of the aircraft instantly, with wreckage strewn across the mountainside. The tail section was thrown several hundred metres beyond, before plummeting down, tumbling into a ravine, and breaking apart.

Small fires erupted amongst the scattered debris, and Tenerife North Airport was jolted by the emergency siren for the second time in just over three years.

Emergency crews arrived at the mountain within hours, but it was immediately apparent that none of the 146 passengers aboard had survived the collision.

The devastation was so catastrophic that not a single intact human body could be recovered, and several victims could not be conclusively identified.

Whilst acknowledging the air traffic controller's error, Spanish investigators placed the entire blame on the Dan Air crew.

However, British investigators argued that the controller should have recognised earlier that the close proximity of the two aircraft would pose a problem, enabling him to implement a standard holding pattern and avoid any confusion among the crew.

They further contended that the controller should not have issued an untried and non-standard holding pattern, but they did concede that the Dan Air crew did not question the controller's instructions or seek clarification.

The British team also criticised Camin's decision to allow flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet. If the holding pattern had been designed in line with official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been set at 7,000 feet.

After receiving a ground proximity alert, the captain - flying blind through fog and cloud - chose to execute a right turn, which tragically steered the aircraft directly into the mountainside.

Standard procedure dictates that flight crews should ascend to maximum altitude when such warnings are triggered.

What is undeniable, however, is that the omission of a single letter in one word sparked the sequence of events that led to the catastrophe. Had the controller used "turns" instead of "turn", the disastrous crash might have been prevented.

The disaster highlighted the crucial importance of precise communication between air traffic controllers and flight crews, with particular emphasis on pilots echoing back Air Traffic Control instructions to prevent any potential misunderstandings.

Despite the disaster, Dan Air managed to recover and continued operations until 1992 when it was taken over by British Airways.

Even though it represented Britain's deadliest plane disaster, the memory of Dan Air Flight 1008 and the tragic loss of 146 lives that day seems to have dimmed over the past 45 years.