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OPINION — You’ve probably seen that iconic photo of Senator Frank Church (D-ID) holding up a CIA poison dart gun, right? Or perhaps the one of Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) aiming it at the sky? They came from the Church Committee’s live hearings on intelligence activities some fifty years ago, in September 1975. We know that the Senate’s Church Committee investigated a wide range of intelligence issues and organizations, including CIA covert operations. And those hearings ushered in a new, more public phase of intelligence politics.
What you may not know is that a few short months later Senate Members and staff quietly reached out to the CIA and the White House for comments on a draft bill to create a new intelligence oversight committee. In mid-December 1975, Senator Charles Percy’s office asked CIA Director Colby to set up a series of “off the record” meetings to discuss congressional intelligence oversight “philosophically as well as practically” because the Senate planned to take up the issue. Similarly, Senators Strom Thurmon (R-SC) and John Stennis (D-MI) sought CIA input for talking points ahead of early January meetings on intelligence oversight. With significant changes and over deep Senate divisions, the draft bill worked its way from the Church Committee to the Senate Government Oversight Committee and through the Rules Committee to eventually become Senate Resolution 400 (S. Res. 400), establishing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI).
In reaching out, the Senate set a critical precedent of seeking CIA “technical assistance” on intelligence-related legislation. The Senate’s request allowed the CIA to advise Senate Members and staff on intelligence issues, highlight potential pitfalls, and offer options for effective oversight. By asking for CIA input, Senators drew the Agency into the political process that helped shape the emerging formal intelligence committee system as the informal system of CIA oversight subcommittees began to fade. The move set a model for sustaining strong, productive ties with the CIA, even at times of heightened tension over intelligence issues.
You’d probably agree that today it's quite common for Congress to consult the White House on legislation. But what is stunning in this case is that Members sought comments “in confidence” on the Church Committee’s draft bill at a time when engaging on intelligence issues was very sensitive. It was also a sharp turn from just two years earlier when Congress barely consulted the White House or the CIA in passing the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which significantly restricted the Executive Branch’s authority to use covert action and expanded the number of committees overseeing CIA intelligence and operations.
It was much different with S. Res. 400. Working with and through the White House, Senate and CIA staff discussed key points of successive drafts from January to February 1976. CIA officials expressed concern about the proposed committee’s jurisdiction because it combined “foreign and domestic intelligence activities,” which they saw as different subjects with “different legal, practical and political considerations.” They also raised issues with a requirement for annual authorizations for intelligence activities, fearing it might publicly expose CIA’s budget. Similarly, Agency officials pointed out problems with the proposed committee’s declassification authorities, limited terms of service for Members, process for committee staff secrecy agreements, requirement to keep the committee “fully and currently” informed on “all intelligence activities,” and the addition of another committee overseeing the CIA.
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Senate and Agency staff worked out some vital modifications to the initial bill text through a series of exchanges. For example, rather than the CIA Director being responsible for keeping the committee informed of “all” intelligence activities, as originally drafted, they agreed to strike the word “all” in favor of having the DCI keeping the committee “fully and currently informed with respect to intelligence activities, including significant anticipated activities.” CIA officials pointed out to Senate staff that the original language “would commit us to a lie,” as “no DCI would know of all the planned activities in order to meet the requirement.” Senate staff in turn explained that what the committee really wanted was to know about the “sensitive, hot, unusual” stuff. So, they struck a compromise. The Senate Government Oversight Committee also made modest changes to other key provisions about annual authorizations of activities, reporting requirements, staff secrecy agreements, and the committee’s declassification authority—with one huge change.
Given significant CIA and White House push back on the proposed intelligence committee’s authority to declassify information, the Senate Government Oversight Committee opted for a Senate resolution rather than a law to create SSCI. Since a resolution would not have the force of law, the committee could assert its authority to declassify information without triggering an immediate constitutional battle over Executive and Legislative Branch prerogatives. Following nine days of hearings, including testimony from DCI Colby and other administration officials, the committee unanimously reported out S. Res. 400 on 24 February 1976, moving the draft resolution to the Senate’s Rules and Judiciary Committees.
The resolution included provisions for the proposed intelligence committee to have primary legislative and annual authorization jurisdiction over the IC, which meant no funds could be appropriated without authorization for activities. Judiciary Committee members saw this as stripping away their jurisdiction over Department of Justice intelligence activities. The measure also included intelligence reporting requirements to the committee and, most importantly, a multi-step process for declassifying information, subject to full Senate concurrence, with or without presidential approval. These issues made the resolution highly contentious. As such, the Rules Committee did not immediately act on it.
Reflective of the Senate, the Rules Committee was deeply divided over the proposed intelligence committee’s authorities. These divisions were on policy not partisan politics. In particular, the differences were over the new committee’s legislative primacy over the IC, the need for annual authorizations, and the authority to declassify intelligence.
So, the resolution languished from March through mid-May as Rules Committee Members deliberated on the intelligence politics at stake. To help shape the debate, the Rules Committee held four days of hearings and invited several Senators to give testimony on the resolution. Significantly they also invited DCI Bush, who had replaced Colby on 30 January and was the only administration official asked to give testimony. In doing so the Rules Committee provided the CIA another opportunity to advise Members on the intelligence issues at stake, shape the emerging oversight committee, and weigh in on the intelligence politics at play.
Naturally in his testimony Director Bush welcomed effective congressional oversight. And he expressed his desire for Congress to be an intelligence consumer. But he also underscored the concerns the Agency had been raising for months.
These included the danger to operations from the growing number of committees overseeing intelligence activities, congressional assertion of the authority to declassify intelligence over the possible objections of the president, potential for annual authorizations of intelligence activities to publicly expose the Agency’s budget, and the move to combine domestic and foreign intelligence oversight under one committee. Commenting on the problem with annual authorizations for intelligence activities, DCI Bush offered a potential path forward. He stated that he was open to briefing the proposed new committee on CIA’s budget and that the committee could then “file a classified letter containing its CIA budget recommendations with the Appropriations Committee.” This would protect the Agency’s budget and preserve the Appropriation Committee’s jurisdiction as well as provide the new intelligence committee input for authorizing intelligence activities and policies.
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The Rules Committee held votes on several amendments touching on the most sensitive issues and ultimately reported out the measure to the full Senate by a narrow 5-4 margin on 10 May 1976. But behind the scenes Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MO) and other Senators swooped in to begin working on a compromise resolution because they knew the measure might not pass the full Senate given the contentious issues, especially on the proposed committee’s jurisdiction. Based on their work, Rules Committee Chairman Howard Cannon provided the “Cannon Compromise,” which ultimately threaded the needle to create SSCI.
The “Cannon Compromise” gave the new committee exclusive legislative and authorization jurisdiction over the CIA. But critically it shared sequential jurisdiction over other national intelligence legislation, meaning other committees would not lose their intelligence oversight role. The new committee would have the right to be “fully and currently” informed of intelligence activities, specifically on significant anticipated activities. It also laid out a detailed, multi-step process for the committee to disclose intelligence over the objection of the president, subject to concurrence by the full Senate.
To further draw out the intent of key provisions and gain support, some Senators from the Government Operations Committee held colloquies, which are somewhat scripted dialogues during floor debate used to clarify issues and document legislative intent in the congressional record. For example, Senators Ribcoff and Nunn held a colloquy about how annual authorizations would not require publication of the CIA's budget. Equally important, several Senators publicly and privately pledged to introduce legislation that would centralize intelligence oversight and roll back the number of committees looking into intelligence activities, aiming to address CIA’s point about the dangers of sprawling intelligence oversight. In the end, the Senate passed S. Res. 400 on 19 May 1976 by a vote of 72-22.
In the process, Senate Members saw the importance of seeking CIA’s “technical assistance” because they understood how complex intelligence had become and wanted insight on how to make intelligence oversight more effective. By drawing on CIA input, Congress set a foundation for enduring, productive congressional intelligence working ties—even during tense times. And while the practice of soliciting CIA’s technical assistance on legislative matters may be little known, it enables informed intelligence legislation and strengthens the ties needed not only for effective intelligence oversight but also for intelligence activities.
The Senate created the SSCI because Americans demanded better oversight of our spy agencies. Senators realized intelligence work had grown incredibly complex but vital for national security. So they asked the CIA for “technical assistance” to gain insight. It might sound odd—asking the CIA to help oversee the CIA. But Senators wanted to understand how to craft effective intelligence oversight to guide intelligence activities and shape intelligence policies. By working with CIA experts, they built a relationship that has lasted for decades, even during rocky periods. This behind-the-scenes cooperation helps Congress create better legislation and maintains the working relationship needed for effective oversight. It’s not without friction because neither gets everything they want. But it is a practical approach: effective intelligence policies and oversight hinge on knowing the business.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
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