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OPINION — When HAMAS attacked Israel on 7 October 2023, Iran and its partners around the Middle East—collectively known as the Axis of Resistance—were riding high. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) armed, funded, and trained HAMAS, Hizballah, the Huthis, and Iraqi Shia militias to help project Iranian power throughout the region. These groups were bound to Tehran by their Shia faith, shared antipathy toward the US and Israel, and support for fighting what they see as Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestinian lands. Now, however, after two-and-a-half years of conflict, the Axis looks more like a collection of disparate groups pursuing their own ends than a unified Shia force destabilizing the region for Iran’s benefit. Nonetheless, pronouncing the Axis dead risks missing the persistent threat these groups pose to US interests.
Since 7 October, Israel has severely degraded HAMAS and Hizballah, decimating their senior ranks and military capabilities. After the horrors of HAMAS’s attack, Israel was determined to neutralize both groups and began an unrelenting series of attacks and daring operations that have killed their most experienced leaders and commanders and destroyed many of their weapons. In Hizballah’s case, the fall of the al-Asad regime in Syria in December 2024 compounded the group’s woes by disrupting critical overland supply routes from Iran. As a result, neither group helped Iran when the US and Israel struck in June 2025. In the current war, HAMAS has remained on the sidelines. Hizballah, however, mounted a large rocket attack against Israel to retaliate for its killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on 28 February. By attacking Israel and breaking a cease-fire that had largely held since November 2024, Hizballah signaled its loyalty to Iran, but also gave Israel the pretext it had been waiting for to resume the war, take (and possibly hold) territory in southern Lebanon, and try to destroy or forcibly disarm the group.
Perhaps the most surprising of Iran’s Axis partners have been the Huthis, which responded to Israel’s offensive in the Gaza Strip with regular missile and drone attacks against Israeli territory and a campaign against maritime shipping that caused disruptions that reverberated worldwide. Before 2023, the group considered Saudi Arabia its main enemy and alternately fought and negotiated with the Kingdom while consolidating control at home. Once the war in Gaza began, though, the Huthis became a persistent threat to the Israel, bleeding its supply of interceptors by launching routine attacks, and holding shipping in the Red Sea at risk in the name of the Palestinian cause, stopping only during cease-fires in Gaza. In June 2025, the Huthis made a token display of solidarity with Iran by lobbing a few missiles at Israel as it pummeled Iran, but did not materially come to Tehran’s aid. In the current war, the Huthis have held fire so far, but Huthi leader Abd al-Malik al-Huthi on 7 March publicly warned that his forces were ready to escalate militarily, which is more likely to happen the longer the war lasts. Unlike other Axis members who have suffered leadership losses and seen their arsenals devastated, the biggest brake on the Huthis’ getting involved is their responsibility for governing their own impoverished state—a burden none of the other Axis partners face. One al-Jazeera commentator posited this month that the group is particularly concerned about the potential threat from the internationally recognized Yemeni Government, which beat back secessionists in December 2025 and might be eyeing gains in Huthi-controlled Yemen next.
Like their partners in the Axis, some of the Iraqi Shia militias are prioritizing domestic political ambitions over militancy. The legislative election in Iraq in November 2025 led some of the Shia militias to focus more on winning votes than advancing Iran’s aims. Not only did the militias fear reprisals if they attacked the US or Israel, they also most likely feared the Iraqi public would blame them for violence and instability in Iraq if the militias themselves provoked US or Israeli strikes in Iraq. This calculation led them to sit out the war in June 2025, opting to hold rallies in Iraq rather than launch attacks in Iran’s defense. Several of the militias also signaled openness to disarming in December 2025, underscoring their shift from militancy to politics. At the same time, other groups, such as US-designated Kataib Hizballah (KH), the most capable of Iran’s partners in Iraq, have rejected calls to disarm and waded into the current conflict by attacking US interests. This month, KH spearheaded attacks against US facilities and personnel in Iraq, particularly in Iraqi Kurdistan and against the US Embassy in Baghdad, in response to the US and Israeli offensive in Iran. Indeed, the group publicly reaffirmed its solidarity with Iran, intent to avenge Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s death, and commitment to driving the US out of Iraq.
Although Iran’s Axis of Resistance is not the cohesive, potent force it was before 7 October, its members remain allied with Iran and staunchly opposed to the US and Israel. As they increasingly pursue their own ends—ranging from simply surviving to strengthening their political clout at home—they are likely to be less predictable. There are a number of factors that are likely to shape their trajectory, including:
•The extent to which new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei sees the Axis as a valuable collective that helps Tehran project power. His decision to reinvest and recommit to the Axis, particularly if he invoked the memory of his martyred father, would help reinforce ties between Iran and its partners.
•Whether the IRGC continues to fund and arm the groups. If Tehran cannot bankroll and arm its partners as it did in the past, these groups will be ever-less responsive to Iranian requests as they seek new sponsors or move away from militancy.
•To what degree groups, especially the Iraqi Shia militias, see politics as a better means to achieving their aims than militancy. If the Shia militias conclude that they can end the US presence in Iraq through negotiations rather than attacks, for example, or that they are better able to deliver economic benefits to the Iraqi Shia community by wielding political power than weapons, they will be more inclined to pursue politics than violence.
•Whether host governments or powerful neighbors curb the groups’ activities. Baghdad’s and Beirut’s ability and willingness to rein in nonstate actors like the Iraqi Shia militias and Hizballah, respectively, will be a significant brake on their ability to threaten the US or Israel. Similarly, Riyadh's success in finding a modus vivendi with the Huthis that boosts the economy in Huthi-controlled Yemen will give the group incentive to stop attacks to ensure its continued grip on power.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
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