FRANCE 24 spoke to Benoît Grünemwald to discuss what’s at stake and the strategies the French government could deploy to effectively combat foreign meddling.
With a year to go before the presidential election, French authorities and cyber experts are forewarning of potential threats to electoral integrity. To assess the current threat level and the necessary responses, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu convened a meeting with political leaders on June 11 to discuss the issue of foreign interference. Lecornu spoke of “serious threats” to the 2027 election, warning that “the entire political class” could be at risk.
Since the ‘Macron Leaks’, a cyberattack blamed on Russia that involved the dumping online of a trove of documents to undermine Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 presidential campaign, the French government has significantly bolstered its fight against disinformation.
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However, advances in generative artificial intelligence, unresolved geopolitical crises and an increasingly disillusioned and politically fragmented voting public are fuelling fears of a flood of disinformation ahead of the 2027 election.
Recent municipal elections may have served as “a dress rehearsal”, said France’s secretary-general for defence and national security (SGDSN), Nicolas Roche, after authorities identified several attempts to destabilise the electoral process.
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Cover image: © France 24 03:39
According to Benoît Grünemwald, a cybersecurity expert at digital security company ESET, combating digital interference requires a multi-pronged approach: through media literacy, preventative measures initiated by political parties and the work of VIGINUM, (the service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference), a specialist unit reporting to the SGDSN tasked with tracking and tracing electoral interference and disinformation campaigns.
Since 2021, VIGINUM has acted as a national bulwark, detecting and countering risks from foreign influence activities, effectively placing France “among the top three [for such services] in Europe”, said Grünemwald in an interview with FRANCE 24.
FRANCE 24: Will advances in AI be a game-changer in terms of disinformation during the upcoming presidential election in France?
Benoît Grünemwald: AI enables disinformation to grow in both quantity and quality. It is clear that large language models (LLMs) [the engines that power generative AI] have changed the game, particularly because you no longer need to be a French speaker to produce high-quality content and credible information.
With AI, it’s possible to create any kind of content imaginable: video, text, audio – and, of course, combine all of these to make it as convincing as possible. It’s just like ‘phishing’ in the case of online scams. Before, you’d just receive a simple email. Now, you’ll also receive text messages, voice calls and even doctored video calls. This is what we call social engineering, where the attack targets not systems but people’s minds.
That doesn’t mean to say that anyone could do it. There are still a number of prerequisites and necessary structures in place, but the barrier to entry is lower. Furthermore, AI makes it possible to generate scale. The reach of these campaigns is therefore much greater. The industrialisation of disinformation is now much easier than it used to be.
F24: Since 2021, the VIGINUM unit, which now comprises around 60 analysts, has been responsible for monitoring such digital interference from abroad. Overall, would you say that France is sufficiently equipped to deal with these risks?
When we look at the European level, whether it be through ANSSI [the French National Cybersecurity Agency] or VIGINUM, France is certainly among the top three in Europe, alongside Sweden and Estonia. These agencies have recruited some excellent talent, demonstrate good governance and have mobilised significant resources in the digital security arena.
However, this remains a team effort. Just because VIGINUM reports on operations carried out by foreign powers does not mean that French citizens are protected from them, especially given how quickly certain content can go viral on social media. Users must also be able to assess the quality and accuracy of the information they have access to.
Political parties also have a role to play in ensuring they have control over their information systems to prevent another ‘Macron Leaks’ or a scandal like the one involving Hillary Clinton’s emails [in 2015]. However, one might wonder whether the limited prominence given to digital issues in political parties’ manifestos might not reflect a lack of attention and interest in the subject.
F24: What do we know about the impact of these foreign interference campaigns?
It remains limited. Even though there are not many studies on the subject, one example is the Paris Olympics. Despite a significant volume of cyberattacks involving both disinformation and attempts at disruption, the impact was minimal thanks to an ecosystem bringing together public and private sector actors, led mostly by ANSSI.
Manipulating the public and public opinion, however, is a long-term endeavour that can be subject to fluctuations. These disinformation campaigns therefore warrant continued monitoring and analysis.
This article has been adapted from the original in French by Nicole Trian.
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