America Is Digitally Fragile — and Our Adversaries Know It

OPINION — America has entered a moment in which it is fundamentally more vulnerable than at any point in modern history. For the first time, the systems that underpin economic prosperity, social stability and military power are not merely digitally enabled — they are digitally dependent and tightly interconnected. At the same time, our principal adversaries have developed the capability and commitment to penetrate those systems, remain hidden and pre-position for future crises, while the United States remains organized for episodic offense and reactive defense.

Adversary cyber operations no longer aim merely to steal information or cause disruption. They are designed to control the environment before conflict begins, constrain U.S. options, and raise the domestic cost of action. The recent intrusions by Chinese malicious cyber actors — commonly known as Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon — clearly illustrate this challenge. These campaigns targeted water, energy, telecommunications, and ports — the industrial plumbing of American life — to establish persistent footholds in the systems modern society depends on and remain embedded there until the moment to exploit them arrives. Disturbingly, much of that access has proven extremely difficult to fully eradicate.

The uncomfortable truth is that the U.S. is perilously digitally fragile. Our economic strength, military readiness and social stability all rest on a digital nervous system that remains poorly understood, inadequately protected and insufficiently maintained. We behave as if these systems are strong and resilient. In reality, they are exposed and increasingly vulnerable. And the convergence of interconnected infrastructure, machine-speed operations, and artificial intelligence means failure can now cascade across sectors faster than leaders and operators can respond.

Imagine a crisis over Taiwan. Before the first U.S. aircraft takes off in response, power flickers, hospital software freezes, water treatment falters and banking slows. For most Americans, it would not feel like war — it would feel like everyday life coming apart. Meanwhile, the U.S. military would confront a sobering reality: its ability to mobilize and sustain operations depends on these same systems. Even the world’s most capable force can be delayed or degraded if the digital terrain beneath it cracks.

This is not fear-mongering. It is foresight. We are not merely under digital attack — we are amplifying the danger through our own unwillingness to accept how fundamentally the world has already changed.

For years, leaders hoped cyber deterrence would take hold. That hope has not been borne out. Below the threshold of armed conflict, cyber operations are cheap, deniable and consistently rewarded. Intellectual property theft, infrastructure mapping and covert pre-positioning generate enormous strategic returns at minimal risk. There has proven to be little incentive for adversaries to stop.

Further, the United States still treats intrusions as isolated incidents rather than continuous campaigns. Private reporting is voluntary and inconsistent. Government responders often learn of attacks only after the damage is visible. Offensively, U.S. cyber operations are highly capable but episodic — powerful actions without sustained strategic effect. Our adversaries play the long game; we respond in bursts.

We can and must do better. The way forward begins with establishing a national objective: Digital Dominance, the process of organizing the nation to lead and define the global digital environment. Digital Dominance is first a whole-of-society posture. Cybersecurity cannot be left to government specialists alone. Businesses, local governments, federal agencies, academia and individual users all operate on the same terrain and share responsibility for strengthening it. We must increasingly work together as teammates in the active defense of the nation.

But Digital Dominance also means ensuring that American digital capabilities — especially advanced semiconductors, large-scale compute, cloud infrastructure and artificial intelligence — become the preferred global standards. When U.S. technologies and architectures set the pace, we reinforce economic competitiveness, shape international rules and give our military the interoperable digital foundation it needs to maintain operational advantage. The future of national power will be decided across the entire ecosystem that designs, deploys, operationalizes and defends digital systems.

Further, achieving Digital Dominance requires the Department of War to pursue Analytic Superiority — the ability to sense, understand, predict and act faster than adversaries, while denying them the ability to do the same. The United States must fuse real-time data, AI-enabled analysis and machine-speed decision-making, while simultaneously disrupting and confusing adversary sensing, data pipelines and AI models/decision systems.

In modern conflict, the side that understands what’s happening first — and acts faster — drives the outcomes. Artificial intelligence makes that possible. It allows networks to spot problems early, connect the dots and respond in seconds rather than minutes or hours. AI isn’t a luxury in cyber operations; it’s the engine that makes conflict-winning speed possible. If we do not fully embrace the operationalization of AI, we will be reduced to playing catch-up with our adversaries.

These realities should also force prioritization. When everything is labeled critical, nothing truly is. The United States currently designates sixteen sectors as “critical infrastructure,” but there are five that really form the backbone of national stability: power, water, telecommunications, finance, and healthcare/emergency services. These sectors are so interdependent that failure in one can cascade rapidly into others. For them, the federal government must receive anonymized, real-time cyber data — not after incidents occur, but continuously. Reactive defense cedes initiative. True resilience requires anticipatory awareness and preemptive action.

However, defensive actions alone are not enough. Locks matter — but so does stopping burglars before they strike. The United States must shift to persistent cyber campaigning: continuous operations that disrupt adversary planning, degrade military capabilities, drain resources, put opponents on the defensive and pre-position our forces in case of conflict. But the government cannot successfully scale this mission on its own. The depth of cyber talent and technical innovation needed to compete with adversaries like China largely resides in the private sector.

A National Cyber Operations Team would integrate that talent directly into operational cyber missions using a “team-of-teams” model, with private-sector operators working under the oversight and command and control of U.S. Cyber Command. Participation would require meeting the Command’s rigorous training, certification, and security standards. This approach dramatically expands capacity while preserving unity of command, discipline, and operational accountability. Just as important, it taps into one of America’s greatest strategic advantages: our fast-moving, innovative technology ecosystem. By connecting that innovation directly to operational needs — rather than burying it inside years of contracting and acquisition bureaucracy — the United States can adapt faster than its adversaries and sustain the initiative in the digital domain.

Some will say these actions are ambitious. They are. But the alternative is far costlier: allowing adversaries persistent leverage over the systems that underpin daily life, economic strength, and national defense. Digital conflict does not resemble the wars we remember. It looks like everyday life suddenly coming to a halt — and with it, the erosion of the advantages that have long sustained American national power.

The U.S. is digitally fragile. We can choose to become digitally strong.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.