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Recent fighting between the Syrian military and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish-led group controlling most of northeastern Syria, ended with the government significantly expanding the territory under its control, particularly in Arab-majority areas. Long the SDF’s primary patron, Washington brokered a ceasefire but sided with Damascus in declaring that the time had come for the SDF to reintegrate into the new Syrian state. This stunning pivot has been long in the making, especially since the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024.
US support for the SDF was always problematic and ultimately destined to end. During my time working on the Syria file at the State Department, I joined several officials in warning the Obama administration that backing the SDF was a strategic mistake that would prolong the conflict and deepen sectarian tensions.
It would have been wiser — though more difficult — to address the root causes that enabled the rise of ISIL (ISIS): al-Assad’s repression of his people and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s sectarian policies. Instead, Washington risked fracturing Syria and undermining its ties with Turkiye.
The SDF was dominated by hardline Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) elements that were actively fighting Turkiye, a critical NATO ally. The group was also deeply at odds with the rest of the Syrian opposition and with most Kurdish factions in Syria and Iraq. We argued that whether al-Assad or the opposition ultimately prevailed, the SDF would eventually be forced to reintegrate into a state structure led by the victor.
Nonetheless, the decision was made to enlist the SDF in the fight against ISIL, while largely sidelining al-Assad’s crimes against his own people. Fast forward to today, and an outcome favourable to Washington appears to be unfolding, despite its role in creating the problem in the first place.
First, the worst-case scenario — retaliation by a victorious opposition against Kurdish civilians — has not materialised. On the contrary, the Syrian government has gone to great lengths to reassure the Kurdish community that it will be protected, while establishing humanitarian corridors for those affected by the fighting.
On January 16, President Ahmed al-Sharaa issued a decree granting citizenship to Kurds and recognising Kurdish as a national language alongside Arabic. The timing was impeccable, undercutting the SDF’s primary claim to legitimacy as the sole protector of Kurdish rights and freedoms. Moreover, Syrian military and security forces largely avoided repeating earlier mistakes seen along the coast and in Suwayda, where violence against minority communities had occurred.
Second, the Syrian military demonstrated impressive operational proficiency in defeating a US-trained and equipped force that had long been viewed as the only cohesive partner capable of countering ISIL and other extremist threats.
Al-Sharaa’s victory will have a powerful demonstration effect, reinforcing Washington’s perception that it now has a willing and capable military partner in Damascus. This opens new strategic options for the US as it reassesses the scope and duration of its military presence in northeastern Syria.
Third, the government gained control over vital oil and gas fields in the northeast; this will significantly accelerate Syria’s economic recovery while reducing its dependence on US financial support. The administration of US President Donald Trump wants Syria to become economically viable as a partial return on its gamble on al-Sharaa and his government.
Accounting for more than 80 percent of Syria’s oil and gas production, these fields will likely attract foreign investment. While US energy firms may participate, thereby benefitting the US economy, the Syrian government is also seeking to diversify its investment partners through agreements with multiple countries.
Of course, these developments remain fluid, and much can change in the coming weeks and months. After its rapid gains, Damascus would be wise to pursue a negotiated settlement with the SDF as it retreats to predominantly Kurdish areas.
Continuing fighting would carry severe humanitarian and reputational costs. On January 18, al-Sharaa announced a US-mediated ceasefire that included integrating SDF institutions into the central government structures. However, talks on the following day failed to resolve the thorny issue of how to incorporate SDF military units.
Both sides should focus on implementing the January 18 agreement rather than drifting towards full-scale confrontation. Al-Sharaa clearly holds the upper hand, but he can further demonstrate statesmanship by signalling, both domestically and internationally, his commitment to a peaceful resolution.
For the SDF leadership, options are increasingly limited given recent battlefield losses and sustained US pressure to integrate. As difficult as it may be, the moment has arrived. The current pause in hostilities offers an opportunity to secure special administrative arrangements in Kurdish-majority cities and regions, such as allowing SDF fighters to continue serving locally even as they integrate into the national security apparatus.
These seismic shifts reflect al-Sharaa’s astute reading of US strategic interests and his ability to act accordingly. Washington has long favoured a unified, stable Syria that poses no threat to its neighbours. For decades, the US tolerated the Assad regime’s brutalities because it broadly maintained these conditions.
With Syria today clearly incapable of threatening regional stability, Trump’s central concern has been whether the country’s new leadership can reunify the nation while preserving order. Al-Sharaa’s recent manoeuvres suggest he may have taken a decisive step towards answering that question.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
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