After the War and After Putin: Three Potential Succession Scenarios for Russia’s Modern Tsar

Speculation about Putin’s health and who might succeed him has circulated for years, in a manner reminiscent of the late Soviet period, when the infirmities of aging leaders were whispered but never openly acknowledged. If and when the war in Ukraine ends, such speculation will almost certainly intensify. Putin has long viewed the war, and the reassertion of Russian control over Ukraine, as central to his place in Russia’s long continuum of rulers. No doubt Putin hopes to be revered one day, despite atrocities committed by his troops, as “Vlad the Great.” Only Joseph Stalin and Russia's longest-reigning Empress Catherine ruled Russia longer than Putin.

Rumors have periodically surfaced that Putin, who turns 74 in 2026, has Parkinson’s disease, or that multiple “doubles” are deployed for public appearances. Theories abound that he has these doubles because, behind closed doors, he is gravely ill. Yet for more than a decade, most of these claims have proven unfounded. Putin has made a point of countering them with carefully choreographed displays of vigor: judo matches, ice hockey games, and the now-iconic images of him riding bare-chested on horseback. Still, the rumors persist, echoing an older Russian and Soviet tradition in which succession is opaque and fraught with uncertainty. And so the question lingers, increasingly unavoidable: what comes after the war for Russia’s leadership, and, what comes after Putin?

For Russians, all the speculation on the health of the state’s leader is a familiar theme from Soviet times. This was especially true in the 1980s, when a series of General Secretaries of the USSR passed away within a few years of one another. Soviet citizens grew accustomed to state TV channels going blank and playing Tchaikovsky’s Swan Lake, one of the most famous pieces of classical Russian music, without commentary. It was the recurring sign for the average Russian/Soviet citizen that, “Well, another of the old guys has passed, so let’s see who comes next.” Sooner or later, Swan Lake will again return to Russian state TV channels, and a successor will pick up the reins.

Intelligence agencies around the world are undoubtedly forecasting internally for their governments. However, ultimately, no one knows for sure what Putin’s succession plan is—if he has one—except the modern Russian tsar himself. Remembering historical precedent may be useful for predictions of how this may play out. Putin certainly has absolute power, like a tsar, and, in the case of the Romanovs, succession for 300 years of Russian history was determined by the family line. Since 1917, when Nicholas II was forced to abdicate, the leadership of the Soviet Union, and then Russia, has been defined less by democracy than by a “preferred candidate.” Traditionally, the regime worked out this candidate, or a small ruling element within it, and then the Russian, and previously Soviet, people were asked to acquiesce and rubber-stamp the selection with a sham vote.

This is, in fact, what happened when Stalin passed away in 1953. NKVD head Lavrentiy Beria attempted to take control, but was shot by General Batitsky, who was loyal to the heavily decorated World War II “Hero of the Soviet Union” and future Minister of Defense, General Georgiy Zhukov. Zhukov and the military had the support of others in the ruling circle. None of them could tolerate the idea of Beria, a known pedophile, torturer, and murderer of millions under Stalin’s purges, bringing a new terror for the Soviet people.

The ruling circle collectively agreed on Nikita Krushchev as the successor, and the military was only too relieved to not be under the guillotine of Beria and the NKVD, which had purged their ranks so heavily. The NKVD was reorganized into the KGB, but retained much of its mission. The Soviet people were asked to validate the choice by sham votes of the Communist Party, then, and for decades to come. This was the Soviet model, in which a ruler was chosen by consensus within the inner circle, the Politburo.

This will also likely be the Russian model after Putin, particularly if he does not leave a firm successor in place, but with some crucial distinctions. There is no Politburo any longer, but the siloviki, or “strongmen,” who control the primary security services and ministries. Who would likely be a successor candidate the siloviki could coalesce behind, or whom Putin might strongly suggest they endorse?

THREE SCENARIOS WHO MIGHT RULE RUSSIA

There are three possible scenarios worth reviewing: intelligence-driven succession, based on the security services and their choice; military-driven succession, based on a General or other candidate from the military (like Zhukov, who was widely popular after World War II and many thought for a time would succeed Stalin); or an unexpected successor, one that Putin may have ordained in private, or still will.

The most likely immediate successor to Putin, even if only an interim one, will likely come from his closest circle of siloviki, with whom he served in the KGB and who have remained close to him throughout his entire career and long reign. Nearly all of them are veterans of the KGB or the security services. The head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Alexander Bortnikov, is probably the top candidate in the event of a sudden succession or health crisis. He heads the internal protective service that guards the regime, and whose loyalty Putin prizes the most. Bortnikov holds the rank of General of the Russian Army, the equivalent of a five-star general in the U.S., while never having served in the armed forces.

Putin gave Bortnikov that rank to ensure he is respected and revered by the entire state apparatus. So his case for succession is clear, and he also has his own troops—the FSB special operations elements, including Alpha, Vympel, and three other special operations teams, which are respected and feared by the government and the Russian people. Bortnikov could also call on aspects of the 200,000-strong FSB Border Guard troops if needed to help consolidate power in the event of a sudden succession or civil turmoil. But Bortnikov is Putin’s exact age, and his succession would likely be short, raising the problem faced in the 1980s, one old man after another.

Other possible successors and former intelligence comrades of Putin in this line are increasingly being speculated about. One could be Nikolay Patrushev, former Secretary of the Security Council and former head of the FSB. Another candidate would be Sergey Ivanov, also on the Security Council now, another former senior FSB leader and former Minister of Defense. Patrushev and Ivanov are both closely trusted Putin advisors, and both were also two of the hawks most in favor of the full invasion of Ukraine. They might be chosen to ensure that Putin’s plans for Ukraine, incorporating the occupied regions, and potential further aggression and plans for it, are not abandoned, at least for a few more years of their potential rule, if selected. But if Patrushev or Ivanov were to be the successor, they would be a short-term one, given their age. Turning to other aged cronies sets Russia up for another 1980s-style scenario: one elderly leader ruling for a few years, dying, and setting the stage for another white-haired ruler. Putin knows that the issue contributed to the decline of the USSR during that period, along with many other endemic failures.

The next category of successor could be a General or a leader of the military, but there is no obvious candidate right now. Former head of the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces, Sergey Shoigu, was once widely respected in Russia because Putin had anointed him to roles groomed for succession. He was feted at military parades in full dress uniform and seen riding celebratory white horses. For Russians, this put him on par with beloved Generals like Zhukov, or Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, the strategic genius who outmaneuvered and defeated Napoleon's invasion in 1812. Shoigu was portrayed as such in Russia for years, and before his defense roles, he served as head of the Ministry for Emergency Situations for many years. This also showed him featured in the scenes of many natural and man-made disasters across Russia. The regime portrayed him as the state fixer and helper.

But Shoigu’s reputation took a significant hit with the Ukraine war. Russians all recall that during the failed Wagner mutiny and leading up to it, Shoigu was one of two people whose necks, literally, Yevgeniy Prigozhin wanted. Prigozhin was Putin’s former cook and oligarch who led the mutiny and set out for Moscow with 20,000 Wagner mercenary troops, to hold Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov responsible. Prigozhin famously screamed on Russian TV, demanding that Shoigu be held to account, and repeatedly cursed and derided Shoigu and Gerasimov in public. Russians will not forget that, nor has Putin. Shoigu is likely no longer a viable candidate.

No other military candidate stands out as a likely successor to Putin, as might be the case in other dictatorial regimes where the military holds power, not so in Russia, and even less so after the attempted Wagner mutiny, which saw far too much possible empathy from the armed forces. Putin has empowered the FSB to quash any other potential challenge from his armed forces. He also strengthened the forces of the FSB and Russian national guard with more heavy weapons (to fight back more competently if any other military unit ever challenges the regime) after the Wagner aborted coup attempt. Ultimately, a successor cannot be found in the ranks of the military.

The third and final category of Putin's successor, and one that many Russia watchers and experts point to as a possible historical precedent, might be someone we don’t know about yet but who Putin has quietly endorsed, or still will. The idea of an unexpected heir may appeal to Putin because President Yeltsin similarly anointed him as head of the FSB, and then selected him as interim Prime Minister when Yeltsin essentially gave up power and stood down in 1999. Putin was relatively unknown at the time, but his being blessed by Yeltsin helped initially. The rest of his popularity came after a series of alleged Chechen terrorist bombings of apartment complexes, bombings which many suspected the FSB itself might have been behind. Much like the burning of the Reichstag in Nazi Germany, Putin used the apartment bombings to launch a massive war in Chechnya, consolidate power, and strengthen his comrades in the FSB. That hardening of the FSB and Russian intelligence within Russian society has continued in the 25 years since.

AN UNEXPECTED, AND YET UNNAMED HEIR?

So if not the FSB or other siloviki from Russian intelligence, where might that unexpected heir come from? There is a slight chance that Putin may choose an actual heir, one of his children. Putin’s only official children are his daughters, Katerina and Maria, from his wife, Lyudmila, whom he divorced in 2014. But both daughters are now in their early forties, and neither keeps much of a public profile. There are rumors of sons from Putin, including two possible young sons from the former Olympian and Putin's girlfriend, Alina Kabaeva, who is almost thirty years younger than him. But neither is yet a teen, and both have lived substantial parts of their lives abroad. They are not in a position to succeed even if they are legitimized later in the eyes of the Russian state and public.

One viable family member who has drawn attention within Russia is Anna Putina (actual surname Tsivilyova) who is his cousin, and now a Deputy Minister of Defense. She was given lucrative state enterprises over the past two decades to benefit herself and the family, and has continued to rise within the circles of power. But is Russia ready for a female president? Some argue that in Soviet times, the Soviet Union was more progressive than the U.S., at least in its earliest years, with women helping lead important ministries for the new Soviet state. But modern Russian society has returned more to its sexist roots, with almost all the siloviki in the top organs of the state surrounding Putin being men.

If Anna Putina is a possible successor, she will have to get past a bunch of Putin’s “rebyata,” his buddies and comrades from the security services, like Bortnikov, Ivanov, Patrushev, and others. A more viable candidate and extended family of sorts for Putin might be Dmitriy Patrushev, currently a Deputy Prime Minister and son of Putin’s close comrade Nikolay, mentioned above. Dmitriy has the right family connections, if not Putin’s name, and he is no doubt considered extended family for the leader. He is 48 years old, setting him up for a long rule over Russia, just like Putin preferred for himself. The young Patrushev has the proper lineage, age, and patronage to make him a prime candidate. Another candidate is Alexey Dyumin, a former Putin bodyguard whom he made governor of Tula and now a senior official on the Security Council. There are other “adopted sons” like this in the younger generation whom Putin could push forward to lead.

Ultimately, the Kremlin watch will have to continue for now, with no clear line of succession laid out for Putin. But there is one reason to expect the succession issues to come to a head in the near future. Putin set out with the Ukraine war to right what he claimed was a historical wrong. In Putin’s fiction, Ukraine was always a part of Russia, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as he frequently termed it, was the “greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century.” In fact, Ukraine has been a far greater disaster for Russia; hundreds of thousands of Russian lives and state resources were wasted on the war. But most Russians don’t know that and can’t see it in the absence of any free press.

The end of the war, whenever it comes, will be heralded as a grand success for Putin. It may give him the final medal on his chest, making him assured enough to feel he can start to plan and announce his succession. When he does, one thing is sure: whoever follows Putin will not likely be a reformer. There will be no loosening of the reins on the Russian people. Freedoms will not come, state oppression will continue, and corruption will continue to drive the regime and state. There are too many holds on those very freedoms, and too many potential contenders holding the ropes to allow any loosening. When Swan Lake is played again on Russian TV, Russians—and the West—will have nothing to celebrate.

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.