What’s Netanyahu’s planned ‘hexagon’ alliance – and can it work?

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has outlined plans to form a new regional bloc, and has framed the Middle East as divided into “radical” Sunni and Shia axes.

Speaking on Sunday, Netanyahu described a proposed “hexagon of alliances” which he says would include Israel, India, Greece and Cyprus, along with other unnamed Arab, African and Asian states. He said together, they would unite to collectively stand against what he called “radical” adversaries.

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“In the vision I see before me, we will create an entire system, essentially a ‘hexagon’ of alliances around or within the Middle East,” Netanyahu said.

“The intention here is to create an axis of nations that see eye to eye on the reality, challenges, and goals against the radical axes, both the radical Shia axis, which we have struck very hard, and the emerging radical Sunni axis.”

However, no government has publicly endorsed this plan – or its sectarian framing. Two of the three countries Netanyahu named – Greece and Cyprus – are members of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has an arrest warrant out for Netanyahu for war crimes in Gaza, and would be legally obliged to arrest him if he set foot there.

Andreas Krieg, associate professor of security studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera that the Israeli prime minister may be overselling his idea.

“The ‘unnamed Arab/African/Asian’ component may exist in the form of ad hoc security coordination and transactional diplomacy, but not necessarily in a way that resembles a NATO-style pact or treaty. It isn’t an alliance,” he said.

“I’d treat the ‘hexagon’ less as a deliverable alliance and more as a branding exercise for a patchwork of existing relationships,” he added.

What does Netanyahu mean by ‘radical axes’?

Netanyahu is seeking to replicate what he describes as his “victories” against the “Shia axis” – also known as the “axis of resistance” – an informal, Iran-centred network of allied groups that oppose Israeli and Western influence in the Middle East.

At its core stands Iran, which supports Hezbollah in Lebanon – long regarded as the region’s most powerful non-state actor aligned with Tehran before Israel killed much of its leadership in 2024.

In Iraq, Tehran maintains ties with various Shia armed groups, including factions within the Popular Mobilisation Forces and groups such as Kataib Hezbollah.

More recently, in Yemen, the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia movement, have risen in prominence, with Tehran providing material support, training and weapons.

Is Netanyahu right about an emerging ‘Sunni axis’ as well?

Not really. Israel attacked at least six countries in the region in 2025, including Palestine, Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, and conducted attacks linked to Gaza in international waters in Tunisia and Greece.

It has also threatened Egypt, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan.

Rather than forming a unified “Sunni axis” – as Netanyahu describes them – several Sunni-majority states in the region have coordinated diplomatically in response to Israel’s regional belligerence.

This coordination has included joint statements condemning Israeli efforts to recognise Somaliland as an independent state, condemning Israeli strikes on Syria and the ongoing genocide in Gaza.

The need to counter Israeli actions also loomed over Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s state visits at the start of February to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Those countries have experienced strained relations in recent years.

“We see that there are growing common efforts by regional countries against Israel, joint statements, joint diplomatic efforts, joint military engagements, the exploration of potential for joint defence adventures,” said Omer Ozkizilcik, a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

“This alliance is not an alliance or not a collective alliance based on an ideology or based on Sunnism. This is a geopolitical, realistic behaviour and these states happen to be Sunni majority,” he told Al Jazeera.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (right) hugs Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a press conference at Hyderabad House in New Delhi on January 15, 2018 [Money Sharma/AFP]

Would India really join?

Netanyahu’s remarks come as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi prepares to visit Israel, where he is expected to address the Knesset and hold talks on artificial intelligence, quantum computing, security coordination and trade.

Modi emphasised the friendly relationship between the two countries in a post on X on Sunday, writing that India “deeply values the enduring friendship with Israel, built on trust, innovation and a shared commitment to peace and progress”.

The two leaders have deepened ties in recent years, but India remains a highly pragmatic actor.

As a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, New Delhi has historically avoided rigid bloc politics. It simultaneously engages China, Russia and the United States.

India also maintains extensive ties across the Gulf. Workers in the region send home billions in remittances annually. New Delhi retains close relations with Iran – describing ties as “civilisational” – while also expanding strategic cooperation with Saudi Arabia.

“The danger is in the signalling,” noted Krieg. Netanyahu’s framing as an “axis vs axis” project “risks hardening regional polarisation, giving Israel’s rivals (Iran, but also Turkiye and others) an easy narrative of encirclement, and making some would-be partners more cautious about being seen too close to Israel.”

Netanyahu’s rhetoric could pull “India further into Middle East fault lines it generally prefers to manage pragmatically, not ideologically,” Krieg said, noting that India’s main interests lie in defence, technology and trade rather than signing up to Israel’s regional ambitions.

From left, Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis hold a joint news conference after a trilateral meeting in Jerusalem on December 22, 2025 [Abir Sultan/AFP]

What about Greece and Cyprus?

In December 2025, Israel hosted Greece and Cyprus for the latest round of meetings under their trilateral framework, established in 2016. Although formally centred on energy and connectivity, the grouping has steadily expanded into security and defence cooperation, in part aimed at Turkiye.

Greece approved the purchase of 36 PULS rocket artillery systems from Israel in 2025, valued at approximately $760m. The two sides are holding discussions about a broader defence package estimated at $3.5bn, including an Israeli-built multi-layered air defence system.

Cyprus has also received Israeli-made air defence systems, with further deliveries expected.

Yet even here, the picture is fluid. Turkiye and Greece have entered a cautious rapprochement. Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis visited Ankara earlier this month in an effort to stabilise relations and expand economic ties.

“The truth is that while there are all sorts of tactical partners Israel might have, technical partnerships and alliances Israel might enjoy, nobody wants to touch Israel with a 10-foot pole,” said Ori Goldberg, an independent Israeli analyst and political commentator.

“Israel is bad news. The Israeli brand has deteriorated to such an extent that it only brings potential chaos and instability, and in the most literal sense, look at what Israel does,” he added.

On the face of it, Israel’s pitch for a wider regional alliance runs counter to the interests of these countries, which Krieg notes are largely centred on “Eastern Mediterranean security and energy dynamics” rather than a broader Middle East project Netanyahu envisions.

Why now?

The initiative comes at a politically sensitive moment for Netanyahu, whose legal troubles abroad have been compounded by legal troubles at home.

“With elections due later this year, Netanyahu has a clear incentive to project statesmanship and to argue that Israel is not diplomatically isolated and that it can still convene meaningful regional and extra-regional partnerships,” said Krieg.

Netanyahu faces domestic pressure over proposed judicial reforms and protests surrounding efforts to recruit ultra-Orthodox Jews into military service.

He is also standing trial in three corruption cases involving charges of bribery, fraud and breach of trust dating back to 2016, which may very well end in jail time.

His “hexagon” initiative “reads as a hedge”, Krieg argued.

“The Saudi normalisation track has become far more politically costly for Riyadh, and Israel is trying to show it has alternatives and can build ‘minilateral’ coalitions around connectivity, energy and security even without a headline Saudi breakthrough,” he said.

Since October 2023, Israel’s economy has faced mounting strain, with business closures rising and credit agencies downgrading outlooks.

“The Israeli economy is not doing well … jobs are disappearing, and investments are much costlier than they were. Israel is faltering at best and sailing at worst,” Goldberg said.

“Nothing Israel does seems to work. So what’s better than to fully retreat into a fantasy world where you have a hexagonal alliance?”