The Arab Spring hasn’t ended, and Arab regimes know it

Exactly 15 years ago, the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia prompted an unprecedented pan-Arab protest movement that demonstrated the overwhelming Arab desire for more democratic forms of government.

In extraordinary scenes, millions of protesters across several countries rallied against authoritarian leaders who had been in power for decades, challenging political systems defined by repression, corruption, and exclusion.

Protester complaints revolved around centralised power structures that bred corruption and injustice and concentrated wealth in the hands of a relative few. What followed was not simply a regional revolt, but a historic demand for dignity, accountability, and democratic rule.

Predictably, regimes responded with heavy-handed tactics – numerous demonstrators were killed, beaten, or arrested.

But the pro-democracy movement achieved significant early successes.

Within months, four longstanding dictators – Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh – were all toppled.

In a handful of countries – Bahrain, Algeria, and Iraq among them – regimes successfully quelled protests, ending them before they could gain serious momentum.

Protest movements in other countries resulted in limited reforms or, in the case of Syria, prolonged civil war without immediate regime change.

Like Syria, Libya and Yemen ultimately descended into violent conflict.

Egypt and Tunisia were the only Arab Spring countries that could point to significant longer-term successes – both countries quickly toppled their dictators and almost immediately began democratic transitions.

Despite mixed results, observers generally praised the Arab Spring as a revolutionary democratic moment for a region long mired in tyranny. Yet, 15 years on, it is clear that while popular demands for democracy endured, authoritarian regimes have learned how to ensure such uprisings would never succeed again.

The cases of Egypt and Tunisia

In both Egypt and Tunisia, democratic transitions appeared initially to take hold: Constituent assemblies were formed, new constitutions were drafted, new political parties and media outlets were established, and new political leaders were elected.

Importantly, in both countries, parties formed by the Muslim Brotherhood – which has long been well-organised in much of the region – quickly gained influence.

Some observers viewed the political rise and influence of centrist Islamists as something benign, even positive, while others argued it posed a problem.

Arguments about the potential merits or shortcomings of political Islam aside, both Egypt and Tunisia were initially seen as hopeful models of Arab democratic transformation, precisely because they suggested that authoritarianism was not an Arab inevitability.

Although their transitions were fraught with serious challenges and sometimes full-on crises, both countries showed that modern Arab societies were capable of building democratic systems, even if imperfect and fragile.

More importantly, perhaps, the examples of Egypt and Tunisia showed that Arab citizenries were democratically eager – election turnout figures in both countries were comparable to those of some established Western democracies.

But appearances and voter turnout numbers were at least partly deceiving, particularly in the case of Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and its representatives came out victorious in referendums and elections, including the presidency, but never truly held power.

Egypt’s “deep state” – the military, police, intelligence agencies, judiciary and media apparatus – never fully exited the political scene.

The old regime successfully sabotaged a pair of elected parliaments and then, in the summer of 2013, collaborated with anti-Islamist Egyptian liberals to overthrow Egypt’s first-ever democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi.

The 2013 Egyptian coup represented a complete democratic reversal, a return to the pre-2011 status quo, and arguably something even more tyrannical.

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who had served as Morsi’s defence minister, quickly consolidated power. He oversaw mass killings, mass arrests, political party bans, media closures, sham elections, and the eventual overhaul of Egypt’s legal and political frameworks.

Experts have argued cogently that the authoritarian system el-Sisi has created is even more despotic than Mubarak’s.

Tunisia’s flirtation with democracy lasted longer than Egypt’s but ultimately experienced a similar backslide.

In 2014, Tunisia prepared a new constitution and elected its first democratic president, Beji Caid Essebsi.

But the 2019 election of a new president, Kais Saied, marked the beginning of the end of Tunisia’s democratic experiment.

In July 2021, about two years after taking office, Saied overthrew Tunisia’s nascent democracy, claiming emergency powers, dismissing the prime minister, and suspending parliament.

Since that time, Saied has further consolidated power.

Lessons learned

It is clear that the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes learned at least one thing from the 2010-2011 pro-democracy protest movements: Their dictatorships had not been sufficiently authoritarian.

In both nations, the political and legal frameworks have been carefully reengineered to prevent exactly the kind of civil disobedience witnessed 15 years ago.

Not even the slightest protest or opposition is to be tolerated.

In Egypt, for example, a 2013 protest law prohibits public demonstrations; and a 2015 terrorism law considers any act of “intimidation” which “harms national unity”, “disturbs the public order”, or “impedes public authorities … from carrying out their work” to be an act of “terrorism”.

The post-2013 Egyptian military regime has also demonstrated that it will not leave any elections to chance.

The government has orchestrated sham elections, passed an electoral law that guarantees the parliament’s fealty to the president, and revised the constitution to extend el-Sisi’s rule to 2030.

Where cracks have allowed opposition figures to run for president, el-Sisi has used his grip on power to have them arrested or forced into permanent exile.

Experts have noted how closely Tunisia’s Saied has followed in el-Sisi’s footsteps.

Although he hasn’t established el-Sisi-level repression in Tunisia, Saied has, like his Egyptian counterpart, rewritten the constitution, expanded presidential powers and eliminated checks and balances.

Data gathered by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index show that, on numerous political and economic indicators, Tunisia has regressed to pre-Arab Spring levels.

Cracks in the system

Fifteen years after the Arab Spring, the root problems that led to demonstrations – corruption, injustice, and economic hardship – still exist and are perhaps more pressing now than they were back then.

Arab countries overwhelmingly score poorly on the annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), with many placed near the bottom of the world rankings, and states also remain mired in injustice.

For example, out of 21 Arab countries recently evaluated by Freedom House, none were rated “free”; and of the nine Arab nations assessed in 2025 as part of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, most placed near the bottom of global rankings.

Importantly, as a whole – Gulf countries notwithstanding – the Arab region continues to be mired in economic hardship.

According to the World Bank, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) remains exceedingly low in most non-Gulf states, and the United Nations says food shortages and hunger remain significant problems across much of the region.

Economic problems in Egypt and Tunisia are indicative of conditions in much of the rest of the region.

In Egypt, since the 2011 uprising, both the military’s economic empire and the inequality gap have grown, while inflation and poverty have increased.

Meanwhile, the Tunisian economy is also backsliding.

According to a recent report published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Saied’s economic approach has led to a huge increase in internal debt and a “collapse of [economic] growth”, in addition to “reduced real wages and increased unemployment”.

Democracy: The elephant in the room

What is perhaps most alarming for Arab regimes is that their citizenries continue to overwhelmingly desire democratic government.

According to the Arab Opinion Index, more than 70 percent of Arab respondents support democracy, compared with only 19 percent who do not.

Survey results also suggest that Arab citizens provide negative assessments of democracy levels in their countries; tend to associate democracy with freedom, equality, and justice; and hold favourable views of the Arab Spring.

More recent Arab Barometer polling suggests similar findings.

The Arab Spring is not over

In December 2024, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was toppled and forced into exile, about 14 years after the uprising against him began.

This cataclysmic event demonstrated, perhaps better than anything else, that analysts may have been premature in declaring the death of the Arab Spring.

Recent Gen Z protests in Morocco offer more evidence that many Arabs – especially young people – are able, willing, and ready to fight for change.

It may, then, be only a matter of time before a boiling point is reached and another round of protests begins.

Governments know the risk is real. Egypt’s el-Sisi regime again provides a useful case in point.

In recent years, el-Sisi has been forced to repeatedly warn Egyptians against protesting.

During public remarks several years ago, he said that a repeat of the 2011 uprising would “never happen again” in Egypt.

The paranoia is real – Egypt’s deep state does not appear willing to take any chances by opening up the political arena.

The regime has recently put its broad election-rigging program into overdrive and is reportedly seeking to extend el-Sisi’s rule indefinitely.

Not content with eliminating opposition at home, the Egyptian government has also sought to prevent opposition abroad.

The regime has tried to shut down opposition media outlets based outside Egypt and has sought to have popular opposition figures extradited to the country.

Earlier this year, a young Egyptian, Anas Habib, organised a peaceful protest at the Egyptian embassy in The Hague.

In response, Egypt’s foreign minister urged embassy staff there to detain protesters and have them arrested. In an act of apparent revenge, Egyptian authorities arrested Habib’s elderly uncle in Egypt.

Beyond Egypt, Arab states have recently begun intensifying internal security cooperation, with governments aggressively seeking out individuals wanted in other countries for extradition.

These extreme actions underscore the paranoia: Arab regimes appear to understand that this is an intermission, not a finale, in the Arab Spring.

History suggests that when the movement continues, it will not be announced in advance.

The people almost always have the last word. We simply do not know when they will choose to speak it.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.