Since February 28, Israel and the United States have pounded Iran with targeted air strikes, taking out one powerful Iranian official after another.
The death toll among top regime officials has so far been confirmed at nine, but Israel claims it has reached 11.
Both the United States and Israel have brandished the growing list of dead Iranian elites as evidence of their military success.
On Tuesday, after the Israeli army announced it had “eliminated” Iran’s security chief, Ali Larijani, Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Saar declared that his country had “already won” the war against the Islamic Republic.
Read moreWho was Ali Larijani, Iran’s security chief killed in an Israeli air strike?
But behind the tough-talking rhetoric, even US President Donald Trump has hinted that Israeli and American bombs will not be enough to topple the regime – regardless of how many heads roll.
Instead, he has appealed to the Iranian public to do the job, telling them that “when we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take”.
FRANCE 24 spoke to Middle East expert Filippo Dionigi, who teaches international relations at the University of Bristol, to understand why regime change is unlikely right now.
FRANCE 24: Most of Iran’s leadership has been killed, why would that not translate into regime change?
Filippo Dionigi: The Iranian regime has historically been developed to be resilient, one that can resist and withstand pressure from the outside.
The regime has been in place since [the Islamic Revolution] in 1979. We’re talking about a formal government that has ruled for almost 50 years and has gone through a number of processes and internal changes: [Ruhollah] Khomeini was replaced by Khamenei, and governments have come one after the other, and so on.
So it’s a regime that has already known change, meaning that – also in this process – it will have the possibility to replace its leadership whenever necessary. It has a mechanism in place for that.
Read moreKhamenei replaces Khamenei: Iran defies Trump, signals continuity
This is not a one-person regime like Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, or Nicolas Maduro’s Venezuela. This is a more complex institutional architecture designed to withstand pressure.
So what could actually bring about regime change?
Organised mobilisation of the Iranian public.
Any change in Iran would have to come from within, not from external forces. The Iranians themselves will not accept change imposed on them from outside without legitimacy.
How would the Iranian public do that, considering the recent crackdown?
That’s the question. The pressure is there, the dissent is there, the legitimacy of the regime is under question.
Social movements and political mobilisation, when organised and overwhelming for the institutions they challenge, can result in change — sometimes unexpectedly. Think of the Arab uprisings of 2011. They produced change because the mobilisations created enormous pressure.
But in Iran, the authorities have been far more effective in repressing opposition and extremely violent in doing so. It would be increasingly hard for the Iranian public to achieve this. What will make a difference is the degree of mobilisation they can muster. They will have to organise better and have a clearer political plan. Otherwise it will be easier to divide them. That division would be a strong asset for the regime and its capacity to repress them.
Is there a viable alternative inside Iran that could replace the regime?
Another aspect to consider is what happens in other regimes when they fall apart. The army and armed forces sometimes take a stance in favour of the public uprising and depose the leader. This is not really happening with the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), which is very close to the regime and becoming increasingly strong politically within the country.
Transitions are never peaceful or straightforward. Iran is a country of 80-90 million people with as many opinions about its future. The idea that removing the regime would automatically lead to a new government has no historical credibility.
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© France 24
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It’s difficult to imagine a clear alternative. It could be a gradual process of reform through elections and an opening of the regime to alternative forms of government. So far, we have not seen that happening. The regime is focused on fighting for its survival.
What results would a popular uprising have right now?
The regime will be particularly aggressive against any form of mobilisation because it feels threatened from the outside and wants to prevent internal threats. It will take a lot of courage for the opposition to mobilise.
At the same time, external threat can strengthen the regime’s narrative allowing it to present itself as defending national interests against foreign enemies. This can reinforce its legitimacy rather than weaken it and make internal opposition more difficult.
What would it take for an uprising to be successful?
The regime would need to be weakened in its capacity to repress mobilisation. The opposition would need to unify and reach a critical mass that can undermine the regime’s stability and produce an alternative. Think of the Arab uprisings: change happened when millions took to the streets and the military refused to act against them.







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