Democracy's Dilemma: Can We Overcome Short-Termism to Build Lasting Peace?

2 weeks ago 7
  • Opinion by Dominic Rohner (geneva)
  • Monday, November 04, 2024
  • Inter Press Service

GENEVA, Nov 04 (IPS) - While the expansion of democracy is a key condition for peace, the Achilles' heel of democracies is that their leaders are constrained by electoral calendars, forcing them to push for peace or delay, whereas autocracies can afford to play the long game to achieve the favorable outcomes they desire.

Take, for example, the current wars in Ukraine and the Middle East: U.S. leadership may be influenced by the approaching November elections, skewing policy decisions, while autocratic leaders of rival powers can be confident in their long-term tenure.

To be clear, this does not suggest that we should abolish democracy. Quite the opposite—more democracy and more bottom-up scrutiny of leaders are needed, as outlined below.

Short-termism lies at the heart of several misconceptions within Western democracies that complicate peacebuilding efforts. One such misconception is the "better the devil you know" mentality, which has long been used to justify support for brutal regimes in exchange for short-term gains.

From the Cold War to the present, global powers have backed dictators and militias, prioritizing strategic influence over human rights. For instance, Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, once an international outcast, was quickly embraced by Western leaders after making some concessions.

However, such cynical realpolitik is not only morally wrong but counterproductive. Supporting autocrats for short-term diplomatic or economic gains only fuels anti-Western sentiment. Recent research shows that U.S. military aid to dubious regimes has often backfired, leading to more, not fewer, terrorist attacks from those nations. Instead of supporting despots, Western nations should focus on promoting long-term peace through jobs, representation, and security.

These are the true foundations of stability, and investing in them is far more effective than cutting deals with dictators. In the end, helping to build peaceful societies is a far better investment than propping up corrupt regimes.

Short-termism has also frequently prompted leaders to prioritize quick cash transfers—often subject to embezzlement—over policies that enhance long-term economic productivity and resilience in fragile countries. The belief that financial aid can "buy" peace is a common misconception.

Peace cannot simply be bought; it must be "invested in" through the development of human capital and productive capacities. Large sums of money, like oil revenues, often fuel corruption and conflict in unstable states. Countries such as Venezuela, Sudan and Nigeria have suffered from the "resource curse," where abundant resources become a source of instability rather than prosperity.

Similarly, foreign aid, when poorly managed, can have unintended negative consequences. Studies indicate that U.S. food aid can sometimes exacerbate conflict in recipient regions, as armed groups divert resources for their own benefit. This is not to say that Western democracies should abandon aid. Instead, they should focus on smarter investments in education and healthcare, which reduce incentives for violence.

Human capital cannot be stolen, and improvements in education and health increase employment opportunities, diminishing the motivation for conflict. Investing in people is the best path to sustainable peace.

A third common misconception in conflict resolution is that winning over "hearts and minds" should come first, with security following later. This is again driven by short-termism, as providing services may be quicker than establishing security. The theory is that by providing amenities and increasing local support, tensions will ease. However, this approach rarely works in practice.

When people's basic safety is at risk, they prioritize security over services or political ideals. Research in places like Iraq shows that security and basic infrastructure must be established first—without them, no other policy can succeed. For instance, the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia successfully ended a brutal war and prevented its resurgence, largely thanks to international peacekeepers.

Offering security guarantees to all parties is essential for bringing armed factions to the negotiating table and laying the groundwork for lasting peace. Without security, efforts to win hearts and minds are doomed to fail.

After examining these misconceptions that jeopardize peace efforts, my new book, The Peace Formula: Voice, Work, and Warranties, Not Violence, outlines the solid fundamentals for achieving sustainable peace in the long term, based on hundreds of empirical studies.

First, there is a growing body of evidence that a democratic voice makes a crucial difference. When citizens have political rights, civil liberties, and their preferences are considered, their incentives for violent attacks on the state diminish.

Every regime in history has eventually felt the need to extend political rights or collapsed. Even autocratic Rome was forced to extend citizenship beyond Italy to survive for a few more centuries. Long-term stability and peace are impossible when citizens are treated as slaves.

Similarly, a strong and productive economy is another prerequisite for lasting peace. Having a fulfilling, well-paid job makes it much less tempting to join a warlord or enlist as a volunteer in a brutal war. These higher opportunity costs of abandoning work for warfare form the second pillar of sustainable peace and stability.

Finally, security guarantees are crucial. When the state lacks a monopoly on legitimate violence over its territory, power vacuums typically give rise to warlords, organized crime, and insurgents that challenge state authority. Consider the rise of the mafia in historical Sicily or the situation in Somalia today. Security is one of humanity's basic needs, and if a state is too weak to provide it, UN peacekeeping troops must be ready to step in when invited.

If the academic literature increasingly provides clear answers on what needs to be done, why then are the components of a peace formula not consistently implemented? While we can point to successful examples of post-conflict reconstruction, such as Germany and Japan after World War II, the list of failed states and aborted democratization efforts is equally long.

The problem can be reduced to the concept of "smart idealism." It isn't rocket science. The issue with "smart idealism" is twofold. First, the "smart" aspect is relatively new. Many of the scientific insights underpinning the above arguments—such as the failure of supporting bad regimes and the importance of human capital—are based on cutting-edge research. Only recently has empirical evidence shown that cash handouts can backfire and that "winning hearts and minds" is futile without basic security.

Second, the "idealism" aspect is a tough sell. Peacebuilding is a long-term commitment that requires significant investments. After World War II, the Allies transformed Germany, Japan, and Italy into functioning democracies, but it came at a steep financial cost. The fear of another world war motivated these efforts.

Today, however, few political leaders are willing to commit such resources to nations like Somalia, where the political payoff is uncertain, and re-election prospects at home may be harmed. Additionally, most politicians operate within short-term electoral cycles, bringing us back to the issue of "short-termism."

Their incentives favor projects with immediate returns, not long-term peace investments that would benefit their successors. In the short term, shady deals with despots may seem politically advantageous, even if they prove disastrous later.

Are these roadblocks insurmountable, or can we do something about them? Yes, we can! Rather than relying solely on elected officials to make the right choices, civil society must apply pressure, advocating for democracy globally. Ordinary citizens have historically driven positive change—think of the movements that dismantled South African apartheid.

Despite global setbacks in democracy over the past decade, fighting for sound, evidence-based policies remain essential. Democracies may falter, but they have an extraordinary capacity to recover, drawing on the remnants of past democratic capital, as Argentina's history demonstrates. As Abraham Lincoln famously noted, "Those who shall have tasted actual freedom I believe can never be slaves, or quasi slaves again."

Dominic Rohner is a globally recognized authority on armed conflict and peacebuilding. He serves as Professor of Economics at the Geneva Graduate Institute, where he holds the prestigious André Hoffmann Chair in Political Economics and Governance, and is also a Professor at the University of Lausanne. He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Cambridge, and his pioneering work has earned multiple international awards and accolades.

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© Inter Press Service (2024) — All Rights ReservedOriginal source: Inter Press Service

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