At least 13 people were killed in fresh sectarian clashes near Damascus on Wednesday, state media and a Syrian monitoring group said, in a second consecutive day of violence targeting Syria’s Druze religious minority.
The clashes broke out in Sahnaya and Jaramana, two suburbs of the capital that are largely populated by the Arabic-speaking community, which makes up just 3 percent of the Syrian population.
According to rescue workers and security sources, armed members of the Sunni majority were spurred to violence by a voice recording attributed to a Druze man ostensibly cursing the Prophet Mohammed that was widely shared on social media.
Druze leaders on Tuesday condemned the violence in Jaramana and said the message was "fabricated".
As the historically multi-faith country rebuilds following the ouster of former authoritarian leader Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s leadership has pledged that minorities will be protected. Government and Druze representatives on Tuesday agreed to hold those responsible for the attack in Jaramana to account.
But increasing violence against Syria’s minority groups has called into question the government’s ability to placate radical Islamists within its coalition and left the Druze community in an increasingly precarious position.
‘A battleground’
Less than two months before the deadly attack in Jaramana, deadly riots targeted another minority group, the Alawites. More than 1,500 people, mostly Alawite civilians, were killed in March by members of Syria’s interior, defence and auxiliary forces, according to the Syrian Observatory For Human Rights.
The Alawites are intrinsically linked with the Assad family as Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, made the community the backbone of his regime.
The Druze had a more tacit agreement with the Assads, cultivating autonomy in their strongholds while accepting Assad’s protection from jihadist aggression since civil war broke out in 2011.
“In towns like Suwayda, the Druze who had demonstrated peacefully against Assad in 2011-2012 accepted the regime's weapons and formed militias,” says Fabrice Balanche, a Syria specialist and lecturer at Lumière University Lyon 2.
As such, the Druze are somewhat “less associated” with the old regime than the Alawites, Balanche says.
But the two communities share similar belief systems combining Islam, Christianity and ancient philosophies that are considered heretical by many Sunnis.
During the war, the Druze were repeatedly targeted by jihadist groups. Al-Nusra Front fighters attacked the northern village of Qalb al-Loze in June 2015, killing at least 20 villagers.
“A lot of [Druze] people have been kidnapped, released for ransom or murdered,” Balanche says.
The prospect of a return to conflict is something many Druze cannot rule out.
“We don't know what's going on, we're afraid Jaramana will become a battleground,” Riham Waqaf, an NGO worker sheltering at home with her husband and children, told AFP on Tuesday.
Alliance with Israel?
Jaramana also saw clashes in March, after which Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz threatened military intervention if the new Syrian authorities committed violent acts against the Druze.
Following clashes this week, Israel on Wednesday came good on its threat and struck Syria in what it called a "warning" against attacks on the Druze minority.
The Druze have communities in Syria, Lebanon and Israel, making up 1.6% of the Hebrew state’s population. This has granted the community a unique and privileged relationship within Israel. Unlike Muslim and Christian Israeli citizens, Israeli Druze are conscripted for compulsory military service in the Israel Defense Forces alongside Israeli Jews.
“Israelis, traditionally, trust the Druze community,” says David Rigoulet-Roze, associate researcher at French international relations thinktank IRIS.
“The Druze are integrated into the Hebrew state, to which its members living in Israel have pledged their allegiance – to the extent that there are even Druze-Israeli general officers who have landed prestigious posts, such as Ghassan Alian, the first non-Jewish commander of the Golani brigade, or General Imad Fares, who was commander of the Givati brigade from 2001 to 2003.”
In March and April, large delegations of Syrian Druze sheikhs were permitted to travel to Israel for a religious pilgrimage despite the two countries officially being at war.
Since the fall of Assad, Israel has sought to fill a vacuum by sending troops to what is supposed to be a demilitarized zone in the Golan Heights, on Syria’s south-west border with Israel. The stretch of land was previously occupied by Israel in 1967 and 1981.
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If Israel is angling for greater territorial control in this strategic zone, “the Druze are likely to constitute an important piece on the regional geopolitical chessboard for the Israelis, due to their cross-border community presence, particularly in Syria”, Rigoulet-Roze adds.
As a gesture to the Druze community in southern Syria – and a tactical move – the Hebrew state has also multiplied the number of humanitarian parcels it sends via the Israeli Druze.
Israel “has a great deal of mistrust in the new Syrian regime, and its tactic is to divide the communities it controls”, says Balanche.
“For Israel, the strategy is to weaken this new regime, and to keep it in a position of weakness.”
One way of doing this is to encourage minority communities to have more autonomy from the Syrian state. But on the ground, Druze autonomy seems unthinkable; the population is scattered throughout Syria, complicating any creation of a single Druze state.
After World War I, plans drawn up by the League of Nations that gave the mandate for Syria and Lebanon to France included an autonomous area for the Druze population. “But the situation today is very different – there is the risk of fragmentation in post-Bashar [Assad] Syria,” says Rigoulet-Roze.
Instead, the new government has tried to strike a compromise. Syria’s leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa in March 2025 signed an agreement with the Druze in the southern province of Suwayda, also known as Djebel Druze, which integrated the community into state institutions “but with local police forces drawn from the Druze population and recognising a [distinct] cultural identity”, Rigoulet-Roze adds.
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An uncertain future
Historically, a fringe of the Druze-Syrian community has also supported Arab nationalism, in the hope that a society in which different faiths were unified by their shared Arab culture would minimise their religious minority status.
Part of the Druze elite also supported Ba'ath, a secular party which was founded in Syria in the 1940s and was later led by the Assad clan, which seized power in 1970.
The party, which controlled Syrian politics for decades, typically viewed Israel as an enemy. This makes accepting the protection that Israel is now offering Syria’s Druze community a precarious, if not dangerous, move.
“Being considered a heretic is one thing, but to be seen as linked to Israel in Syria is even worse,” says Balanche.
Some Druze dignitaries have responded by reaffirming their commitment to the Syrian nation, even though doing so may not guarantee their safety.
For Syria’s Druze, there is no easy path to follow – and plenty of potential unknowns.
“Can we trust the new Syrian regime? Can we trust Israel, or will it leave us hanging? We're Arabs, so how can we support Israel's war on Gaza?” asks Balanche. “The Druze today are facing a lot of complicated questions.”
This article was adapted from the original in French.
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