China's Disinformation Offensive in Taiwan

Every day, social media feeds in Taiwan are flooded with a mix of sensational and carefully-crafted, more subdued claims. They range from fear-mongering about a potential cross-strait conflict to narratives portraying the Republic of China as grappling with racism and food safety issues, to casting doubt on its relationship with Washington.

In 2023, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau reported a 60 percent increase in Chinese-origin disinformation over the previous year, with a documented 2.16 million cases on record. Now, as tensions between Beijing and Taipei continue, so too does the sophistication—and volume—of the Chinese Communist Party’s disinformation campaign.

“China conducts overwhelming political warfare against Taiwan—disinformation, cognitive warfare, fake news,” Liang-Chih Evans Chen, Associate Research Fellow, Institute for National Defense and Security Research, tells The Cipher Brief. “It’s a constant battle for public perception and morale. And it’s getting worse.”

According to Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, China is increasingly leveraging generative artificial intelligence to amplify disinformation efforts aimed at destabilizing Taiwan.

“The quality used to be questionable, but that has changed. With AI and deepfake technology, the People’s Liberation Army can manipulate videos and other very convincing media,” one high-ranking Taiwanese military official working in psychological operations, who spoke anonymously because they are not authorized to speak on the record, tells The Cipher Brief. “Sometimes, they also take raw local footage and re-edit it to appear as if it’s coming from within Taiwan, making it more believable and easier to influence people.”

So far in 2025, more than 500,000 “controversial messages” linked back to China have circulated on platforms like Facebook, TikTok, and X, often spiking during politically sensitive moments such as President Lai Ching-te’s statements on cross-strait relations or major announcements like new U.S. investments by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC).

Disinformation is also spread through YouTube, encrypted apps like WhatsApp and Telegram, and via fake accounts that used AI-generated profile photos, deepfakes, and phony news articles to make propaganda appear organic and credible.

“Starting around 2008, China’s main strategy was to purchase media companies in Taiwan to spread their narratives easily. This was somewhat successful. But in 2014, after the Sunflower Movement, a large student-led social movement, China realized young people weren’t watching traditional TV; they got news online,” DPP Legislator and Associate Professor at National Taipei University Graduate School of Criminology, Puma Shen, tells The Cipher Brief. “They created many websites that acted like news outlets but were actually filled with disinformation and fake news. Some were based in Singapore or Malaysia but operated by Chinese actors.”

Shen explained that Facebook was long the “main channel for distribution.” His team reported suspicious sites to the tech giant, which subsequently blocked them, but “this method only worked until around 2019-2020,” according to Shen.

“After that, they shifted focus to YouTube. They used AI voices to convert articles into videos with images and then shared those videos on Facebook. Facebook couldn’t block YouTube URLs, so this became a new battlefield,” Shen told us. “Currently, 70 to 80 percent of political news in Chinese on YouTube is influenced by China’s disinformation campaigns. Google tries to act but struggles. Before Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election, Google removed about 200 Chinese government-related channels per day, but it’s hard to keep up.”

The biggest struggle now is TikTok, as Taipei has “no cooperation there,” according to Shen.

“The algorithm controls what information people see. It’s designed for quick, passive consumption, making it a great tool for brainwashing. Even if only one video out of fifty contains a political message, that message gets embedded in your mind,” Shen said. “The algorithm isn’t transparent, so they can decide what to show and influence people’s thoughts. This is dangerous, especially when people spend hours swiping through videos daily.”

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Observers also point out that Beijing has shifted its tactics in recent years, moving away from overt messaging on cross-strait relations to more passively stoking internal divisions within Taiwan. This includes smear campaigns and false claims about local services. Often, the disinformation is masked as clickbait—celebrity gossip or wellness content—that subtly steers readers toward politically motivated conspiracy theories.

The mainland’s disinformation efforts involve a broad network of state actors, including its military’s Strategic Support Force, the Ministry of State Security, the Central Propaganda Department, and the Ministry of Public Security—all playing distinct roles in cyber operations, propaganda, and information control. These agencies push overt messaging through state media and diplomatic channels and run covert campaigns, often in partnership with private companies or loosely affiliated groups like hacktivists.

Outsourcing these operations to commercial entities is a growing trend, making attribution more difficult. This includes paid propagandists, troll farms, clickbait content creators, and data firms selling disinformation tools. By hiring third parties to execute these campaigns, the Chinese government obscures its involvement, complicating accountability and amplifying the reach and sophistication of its influence operations.

Tactics also include collaborating with sympathetic Taiwanese media, amplifying critical voices from within Taiwan—such as retired military officials and political influencers—and targeting younger audiences through popular platforms.

Experts underscore that disinformation is becoming more subtle, often disguised as health advice or entertainment before veering into political messaging. While Beijing denies interfering in Taiwan’s affairs, the growing sophistication of these campaigns, bolstered by evolving AI tools, poses an increasingly complex threat to Taiwan’s information integrity and security.

China’s disinformation campaign aims, analysts say, to erode public trust in Taiwan’s government, particularly the ruling DPP while deterring support for Taiwanese independence.

Ching Yang, one of the leading investigators at the Taipei-based disinformation monitoring organization Doublethink Lab, highlighted that newspapers in Hong Kong “have recently accused certain politicians or their families of accepting U.S. money to create divisions between Taiwan and Mainland China.”

“They use allegations about projects and funding to drive disinformation aimed at weakening Taiwan’s unity,” he tells The Cipher Brief. The DPP, however, may not be the CCP’s primary target.

“The real enemy for China is not Taiwan,” Shen stressed. “It is the U.S.” He points out that there are around 13 “main narratives” the CCP uses in its disinformation push.

“We tested which resonated most with Taiwanese teenagers — anti-U.S. messages ranked highest,” Shen explained. “They push anti-U.S. messages both inside Taiwan and in the U.S. They (CCP) try to undermine trust in the U.S. and the West generally. Also, they discourage cooperation with Japan and India. For Taiwanese who are anti-China but consume enough anti-U.S. messaging, the strategy is to make them see China as not so bad.”

In Taiwan, the disinformation approach is mainly to suggest that Washington is unreliable, would abandon Taiwan in a conflict, or is exploiting the island—such as claims that U.S. arms sales are a scam or that U.S. pork is not safe to consume, claims that have triggered large protests in the past.

These messages, often amplified by Beijing-linked actors or Taiwanese figures sympathetic to China, don’t always rely on conspiracy theories; instead, they illuminate real news in ways that cast the U.S. in a negative light, fueling skepticism and weakening trust in the U.S.-Taiwan alliance. From Shen’s purview, the objective is to “sow distrust.”

“Don’t trust the government, don’t trust the ruling party, don’t trust democracy or the U.S,” Shen noted. “They (CCP) want to persuade maybe 40-50 percent of Taiwanese that China isn’t so bad, and that if China invades, it could take over quickly — so better to sign a peace agreement. The CCP wants to persuade its citizens that it’s the best party because it brings stability and prosperity.”

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These low-cost, high-impact campaigns also serve a purpose for the CCP at home. Inside the mainland, disinformation helps legitimize potential military action by manufacturing public support and framing aggression as a justified response to Taiwanese provocation, reinforcing nationalist sentiment. Internationally, these campaigns offer China a legal and moral veneer, particularly for non-Western audiences, while casting Taiwan and its allies—especially the U.S.—as aggressors.

Taipei faces significant challenges in addressing threats posed by disinformation. The Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau established the Cognitive Warfare Research Center last year, to counter disinformation campaigns targeting Taiwan’s democracy and security. In January, the government pledged to double down on its efforts to counter burgeoning disinformation campaigns. In late 2022, the government designated Chinese media platforms—including TikTok— a “national security threat” and banned their use on government-issued devices.

While Beijing’s efforts to influence public opinion have largely fallen flat, fatigue is setting in among Taiwanese citizens who are exposed to constant warnings and pressure. Experts warn that as Taiwan sharpens its defenses, China will only evolve its tactics, making future disinformation campaigns harder to detect and resist.

“Taiwanese people generally recognize the danger from China. But politicians here, like in many countries, sometimes try to downplay it or persuade citizens otherwise,” Shen said. “Since we speak Chinese, we’re vulnerable to Chinese disinformation and “lawfare,” China’s legal and political warfare to keep Taiwan isolated internationally.”

Yang is concerned that Beijing’s growing use of disinformation as a soft power tool could signal a prelude to more aggressive, hard-power or kinetic action.

“Compared to Russia’s tactics before invading Ukraine, China uses disinformation to frame their opponents negatively. For example, Russian propaganda accused Ukraine of being run by Nazis,” he added. “Similarly, in Taiwan, Chinese media accuse the ruling Democratic Progressive Party and President Tsai Ing-wen of being ‘Nazis’ or extremists. This disinformation aims to justify aggression and create division internally.”

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